Marquette Law Review
Volume 96
Issue 2 Winter 2012

Article 8

Justification for Creating an Ombudsman Privilege
in Today's Society
Ryan Spanheimer

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Ryan Spanheimer, Justification for Creating an Ombudsman Privilege in Today's Society, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 659 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol96/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

13 SPANIMAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/6/2013 9:31 PM

JUSTIFICATION FOR CREATING AN
OMBUDSMAN PRIVILEGE IN TODAY’S
SOCIETY
Due to ever-increasing court congestion and contemporary policy
favoring the resolution of disputes outside the courtroom, now more than
ever a privilege for communications with an ombudsman is needed.
Although statistics demonstrate that an ombudsman can quickly and
effectively resolve disputes, courts have been inconsistent in recognizing
such a privilege. This failure to consistently recognize a privilege for
communications with an ombudsman places practicing ombudsmen in a
catch-22. Ombudsmen are left to decide between disregarding standards
of practice they have sworn to follow, most notably that ombudsmen keep
communications in confidence, on the one hand, or of violating a court
order requiring disclosure of the communications made to the
ombudsman, on the other. Recognizing an ombudsman privilege will
eliminate this dilemma without unduly impeding access to evidence, as an
ombudsman privilege is merely a different embodiment of privileges and
rules of evidence already in effect.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today court congestion continues to escalate, and as a result
alternate methods for resolving disputes have become increasingly
1
widespread. One of these alternative dispute resolution techniques that
has been implemented in organizations ranging from private businesses
2
to governmental and education institutions is the use of ombudsmen.
An ombudsman is a neutral member of an organization who receives
complaints from employees inside the organization, as well as third
parties external to the organization, and attempts to resolve these
3
complaints through various dispute resolution methods.
Statistics show that use of an ombudsman within an organization
may help to not only effectively solve the inevitable disputes that
frequently arise, but also help to prevent unethical conduct within the
4
organization. However, these significant benefits that an ombudsman
may provide to an organization hinge on the guarantee to complainants
5
that the communications with the ombudsman will be kept confidential.
Without a guarantee of confidentiality an ombudsman cannot function
effectively because complainants will be hesitant to come forward with
6
issues regarding the organization for fear of retaliation.
The centrality that confidentiality plays in the ombudsman process is
embodied by the numerous standards of practice that have been
promulgated to regulate practicing ombudsmen, which require
ombudsmen keep nearly all communications with a complainant
7
confidential. Despite the ombudsman’s duty under these standards of
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part II.C.
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. The International Ombudsman Association (IOA) standards require an ombudsman
to “hold[] all communications with those seeking assistance in strict confidence
and take[] all reasonable steps to safeguard confidentiality . . . .” IOA STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE § 3.1 (Int’l Ombudsman Ass’n 2009), available at http://www.ombudsassociation.or
g/sites/default/files/IOA_Standards_of_Practice_Oct09.pdf.
Similarly, the United States
Ombudsman Association places the discretion to disclose information with the ombudsman
and requires an ombudsman “not [to] reveal information when confidentiality has been
promised.” GOVERNMENTAL OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS §§ I(C), II(A)(8)(d), II(C)(1)–
(2) (U.S. Ombudsman Ass’n 2003), available at http://www.usombudsman.org/documents/PD
F/References/USOA_STANDARDS.pdf. Importantly, both standards plainly state the
ombudsman should not be compelled to testify. Id. § II(C)(3); IOA STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE, supra, § 3.3.
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practice to maintain the confidence of a complainant’s communications,
courts have recently held that these communications are not privileged;
8
therefore, disclosure may be compelled. When a court allows discovery
of communications with an ombudsman it leaves the ombudsman with
the choice of either violating the court’s order or violating the standards
9
of practice the ombudsman has sworn to abide by.
Therefore, it is essential that a privilege be granted for
communications with an ombudsman as confidentiality is vital to the
ombudsman process. Indeed, this process provides a critically important
alternate route to litigation in contemporary times of increasingly
congested court dockets, but yet courts have recently put practicing
ombudsmen in the challenging position of choosing between violating a
10
court order for disclosure or violating their standards of practice.
Furthermore, granting an ombudsman privilege would both be
exceptionally similar to the current recognized mediation privilege, and
it would also further the increasingly important policy of settling
11
disputes outside of court.
Prior writings discuss the importance of an ombudsman privilege.
12
This comment will build upon several of these works, beginning in Part
II by discussing the benefits of using an ombudsman and provide
13
statistics on general use of ombudsmen in various organizations. Next,
Part III will explain the critical role confidentiality plays in the effective
14
use of an ombudsman. Then, Part IV will consider the differing views
courts have taken on an ombudsman privilege over the years, as well as
where the law stands today and what a practicing ombudsman can do to
increase the chances that complainant communications are kept
15
confidential. Finally, Part V will explore the similarities between an
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. See infra Part IV.C.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See Christina M. Kuta, Comment, Universities, Corporations, and States Use Them—
Now It’s Time to Protect Them: An Analysis of the Public and Private Sector Ombudsman and
the Continued Need for a Privileged Relationship, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 389 (2003); Scott C. Van
Soye, Illusory Ethics: Legal Barriers to an Ombudsman’s Compliance with Accepted Ethical
Standards, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 117 (2007); Brenda V. Thompson, Comment, Corporate
Ombudsmen and Privileged Communications: Should Employee Communications to
Corporate Ombudsmen Be Entitled to Privilege?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 653 (1992).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
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ombudsman privilege and the widely accepted mediation privilege as
well as the similar policy shared by an ombudsman privilege that is
behind Federal Rule of Evidence 408 to demonstrate that creating an
ombudsman privilege is nothing more than the next logical step in
16
today’s society.
II. USE OF AN OMBUDSMAN TO PREVENT MISCONDUCT AND
EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH COMPLAINTS
How does society detect and prevent misconduct, as well as settle
disputes in educational, governmental, and private business institutions?
The answer to this question for most of our nation’s history was, and to
17
a large degree continues to be, litigation through the courts. However,
the use of the courts to quickly resolve disputes today is at best wishful
18
thinking. Indeed, with the continued increase in case filings, it does not
appear that litigation through the courts will be a route for quick dispute
19
resolution anytime in the near future. Due to this lack of timely
resolution of disputes through the courts, there has been a trend toward
20
the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). In fact, public policy
and the Supreme Court favor “promoting non-judicial settlement of
21
disputes.”

16. See infra Part V.
17. See STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS 40 tbl.C (2010) [hereinafter STATISTICS DIVISION], available at http:/
/www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatist
ics2010.aspx (showing that 258,535 civil actions were filed in the United States District Courts
in the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2009, and that 282,307 civil actions were filed in
the next twelve-month period).
18. See id. at 59 tbl.C-5 (showing median time to trial in federal court is almost twentyfour months).
19. See id. at 40 tbl.C (showing an increase in case filings of 9.2% between 2009 and
2010).
20. Thompson, supra note 12, at 672 (noting a “trend toward ADR”).
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,
7081 (providing the congressional view of public policy on the issue). In 1973, the United
States Supreme Court submitted a proposal to the Committee on the Judiciary that
eventually became the current Federal Rule of Evidence 408(a)(2). Id. Rule 408(a)(2)
makes certain conduct and statements made in compromise negotiations inadmissible in
subsequent litigation. FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2). One of its goals, as indicated by the
Congress, was precisely to promote non-judicial settlements of disputes. H.R. REP. NO. 93650, at 8.
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A. Who is an Ombudsman?
One area of ADR that detects and prevents misconduct, as well as
quickly settles disputes in educational, governmental, and private
22
business institutions is the use of an ombudsman. An ombudsman is a
neutral member of a public or private association who receives
complaints from sources both internal and external to the association
and helps to resolve these complaints through mediation, counseling,
23
and other innumerable dispute resolution techniques. The use of an
ombudsman can take various forms depending upon the organization in
which an ombudsman is implemented; however, there are five generally
accepted categories of ombudsmen: the classical, the executive, the
24
educational, the corporate, and the newspaper. Notwithstanding these
various types of ombudsmen, the term “ombudsman” will be used
throughout this comment in the general sense to refer to a neutral
person within any public or private organization who detects, receives,
and resolves disputes in lieu of the disputes going to court.
B. Benefits of Using an Ombudsman
It is apparent that Congress has known about the overall beneficial
effects that the use of an ombudsman can have for some time. In 1990,
25
consistent with the “trend toward ADR,” Congress passed the
26
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act. Generally this Act requires
27
that federal agencies adopt a policy that addresses the use of ADR.
Interestingly, the Act was soon thereafter reenacted in 1996 to include
28
“use of ombuds” in the statutory definition of ADR. However, this
legislation simply incorporated what had already been the practice in
22. 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2:62, at 40–41 (3d ed.
2005).
23. Id.
24. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 119–25.
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
26. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–84 (2006)).
27. Id.
28. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 2, 110 Stat.
3870, 3870 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 571); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-01-446, HUMAN CAPITAL: THE ROLE OF OMBUDSMEN IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 7 (2001) [hereinafter HUMAN CAPITAL] (discussing federal agencies movement
“towards greater use of ADR to deal with workplace disputes by legislation, policies of the
adjudicatory agencies, and by the desire to avoid the time, cost, and frustration of the more
formal dispute resolution processes”).
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several federal agencies, including the IRS, EPA, and Commerce
Department, that had been successfully using an ombudsman program
29
since the 1980s. Importantly, this successful implementation of an
ombudsman is not limited solely to the public sector.
In addition to use in federal agencies, ombudsmen can be effective in
large corporations to help alleviate the negative public perception of
30
these corporations. As the former Chairman and CEO of McDonnell
Douglas Corporation once put it, “the average man in the streets right
31
now thinks we’re all a bunch of crooks.” This general negative public
perception of corporations can be traced to numerous corporate
scandals that have been the center of media attention over the past
32
fifteen years.
This negative public image of the corporation, in
addition to the lack of checks and balances within many corporate
33
organizations of the past, warrants the use of an ombudsman. Not only
can the use of an ombudsman in a corporation improve the
corporation’s public image, but it can also lead to an increase in the
34
overall ethics of the corporation.
Increasing corporate ethical
standards is important for many unquantifiable reasons, in addition to
the fact that a majority of corporate executives “believe high ethical
35
standards improve a company’s competitive position.”
Ombudsmen, whether used in a public or private organization, are
unique because not only can they resolve disputes outside of court, but

29. Kuta, supra note 12, at 397.
30. Victor Futter, An Answer to the Public Perception of Corporations: A Corporate
Ombudsperson?, 46 BUS. LAW. 29, 55 (1990) (“If the institution of the ombudsperson could
be made to work successfully, it will be developed in a variety of ways by the country’s
diverse corporations and it should help to improve the public perception of corporations and
to restore public confidence in their behavior.”).
31. Id. at 30.
32. See, e.g., Cathy Booth Thomas, Called to Account, TIME, June 24, 2002, at 52
(discussing accounting firm Arthur Andersen’s role in Enron fraud, and finding that the firm,
simply because it was associated with Enron, “had already been found guilty in the court of
public opinion” before its trial for obstruction of justice began).
33. Kevin L. Wibbenmeyer, Privileged Communication Extended to the Corporate
Ombudsman-Employee Relationship Via Federal Rule of Evidence 501, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL.
367, 370.
34. Futter, supra note 30, at 55 (concluding that the ombudsman can invigorate
corporate integrity with the public as well as ensure corporate integrity for corporations
themselves).
35. Id. at 49 & n.66 (citing Selwyn Feinstein, Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1987, at
1) (“[T]wo-thirds of the corporate executives questioned ‘believe high ethical standards
improve a company’s competitive position.’”).
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they also can prevent disputes from occurring in the first place. In fact,
it has been shown that ombudsmen in corporations spend approximately
30% of their time reporting to corporate management on “new or
37
potential problems in the organization.” Furthermore, the use of an
ombudsman allows organizations an opportunity to detect potential
38
problems sooner, when the prospective negative impact is less severe.
Indeed, an ombudsman facilitates “[t]hings get[ting] surfaced that
39
wouldn’t get surfaced any other way,” and thus helps organizations
using an ombudsman to avoid liability in countless areas of the law,
including business practices, Sarbanes-Oxley concerns, and equal
40
opportunity claims.
In addition to the valuable benefit a corporation receives from the
early detection of problems, an ombudsman also provides numerous
other advantages. First, as briefly mentioned earlier, an ombudsman
41
allows an organization to avoid court. This route around litigation is a
major reason why the use of ombudsmen has been found to be cost42
effective. This is due to the time and cost litigation imposes upon
43
litigants. As compared to formal court proceedings, an ombudsman
44
resolves disputes in significantly less time.
For example, in one
ombudsman program 40%of resolved cases were closed in two weeks,
and the other 60% within six weeks, of when the complaint was
45
received.

36. HUMAN CAPITAL, supra note 28, at 3–4. “A key feature distinguishing ombuds from
other dispute resolution practitioners is the ombuds’ focus on systemic issues and on
developing conflict prevention strategies.” Id. at 8.
37. Thompson, supra note 12, at 666 (citing Mary P. Rowe, The Corporate Ombudsman:
An Overview and Analysis, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 127, 132 (1987)).
38. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322.
39. Ombuds Can Help Address Conflicts, Potential Lawsuits, HR FOCUS, Oct. 2005, at
8–9 (quoting Wendy Fried, a corporate ombudsman).
40. Id. at 9.
41. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322; Thompson, supra note 12, at 653.
42. Mary Elizabeth McGarry, The Ombudsman Privilege: Keeping Harassment
Complaints Confidential, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 1995, at 1, 7 (citing Rowe, supra note 37, at 136);
see MARY ROWE & MARY SIMON, EFFECTIVENESS OF ORGANIZATIONAL OMBUDSMEN 8
(2001), http//web.mit.edu/ombud/publications/effectiveness_final.pdf.
43. See STATISTICS DIVISION, supra note 17, at 59 tbl.C-5 .
44. See, e.g., Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570, 572 (E.D. Mo. 1991)
(“A successful ombudsman program resolved many problems informally and more quickly
than other more formal procedures, including court actions.”).
45. HUMAN CAPITAL, supra note 28, at 21–22 (reporting on the success of the
ombudsman program at the National Institute of Health).
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Second, in addition to resolving disputes more quickly than
litigation, an ombudsman conserves an organization’s resources because
an ombudsman is much less costly than hiring outside counsel to
46
investigate a dispute within the organization.
Moreover, if an
ombudsman prevents one key lawsuit from being filed against a large
corporation or stops one controversial issue about the organization from
being disseminated in the media, the ombudsman has more than
47
justified the cost to that organization. In addition to saving litigation
costs, there are enormous productivity and efficiency costs a large
48
organization can incur by letting problems go unnoticed. For instance,
ongoing sexual harassment in the workplace can cost a large employer
49
millions in absenteeism, low productivity, and employee turnover.
Thus, to the extent an ombudsman is resolving these issues early, the
ombudsman is facilitating enormous future cost savings to the employer.
A third benefit the use of an ombudsman brings to an organization is
a result of the fact that the organization’s potential problems and
disputes are resolved solely by the ombudsman, therefore allowing the
managers and executives of the organization to exclusively concentrate
on their primary goals of earning profits, organizational growth, and
50
competing in the market place. Finally, the implementation of an
ombudsman benefits the employees of the organization because it
provides them a neutral person to whom they can fully voice concerns in
51
confidence. This ability to voice concerns in confidence encourages

46. Futter, supra note 30, at 48.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 49 (finding that in addition to saving a company potential damages in
litigation, having an ombudsman could “avoid a tremendous amount of damaging publicity as
well as save an inestimable amount of management time, attention, distraction, worry, and
expense”).
49. McGarry, supra note 42, at 1. “Sexual harassment costs a typical Fortune 500
company with 23,750 employees $6.7 million per year in absenteeism, low productivity and
employee turnover.” Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING
WOMAN, Dec. 1988, at 69, 71.
50. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322 (“Other areas or departments of the
organization may acquire additional time to work on more focused departmental goals.”);
Futter, supra note 30, at 36 (stating that an ombudsman can permit a CEO to focus attention
on “earning profits, strategic planning, and meeting both domestic and foreign competition”);
Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 371 (noting that an ombudsman “frees top management to
concentrate on activities necessary for the profitable growth of the corporation”).
51. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322 (noting that an ombuds program “provide[s] a
safe mechanism for persons to raise concerns”); Futter, supra note 30, at 36 (stating that the
creation of an ombudsman “assists employees who, for one reason or another, find it difficult
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those employees who fear retaliation to come forward with their issues
52
and leads to an overall increase in the morale of the organization. In
addition, this outlet for confidential voicing of concerns will facilitate
and encourage appropriate individual behavior throughout the
53
organization.
C. Statistical Use of an Ombudsman
Considering all of the benefits that the use of an ombudsman can
bring to an organization, it only follows that more organizations are
starting to realize these benefits and the use of ombudsmen is on the
54
rise.
In fact, the use of ombudsmen has now gained worldwide
55
recognition. Indeed, the United Nations employs an ombudsman
56
department that handled 2,267 cases in 2011. In the United States, a
survey a few years ago found that about ten percent of the responding
corporations employed an ombudsman and that in total over 1,000
57
corporations in the United States use ombudsmen.
The use of
ombudsmen in United States corporations continues to grow, and
currently ombudsmen are used in many iconic corporations including
58
McDonald’s, AT&T, American Express, and Federal Express. In
addition to the growing use of ombudsmen in corporations, higher
educational institutions across North America continue to effectively
use ombudsmen with currently over 200 colleges and universities
59
employing an ombudsman department. Across all of these various
organizations where ombudsmen are routinely used, it has been
estimated that the average ombudsman may receive 200–300 complaints

or impossible to go through normal reporting channels”).
52. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322 (“Increased morale and relationships should
be more harmonious.”).
53. Futter, supra note 30, at 36–37.
54. Corie Marty, Recent Development, Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 13 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 275, 275 (1997).
55. DOUGLAS H. YARN & GREGORY TODD JONES, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN GEORGIA § 11:31, at 373 (3d ed. 2006).
56. Ombudsman and Mediation Services: Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ombudsman/faqs.shtml#4 (last visited Oct. 30, 2011)
[hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
57. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 124 n.73 (citing Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Ombudsman Offices
in the Federal Government—An Emerging Trend?, 22 ABA ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS,
Summer 1997, at 6).
58. YARN & JONES, supra note 55, § 11:31, at 373.
59. Id. at 374.
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a year regarding a wide range of legal issues, including wrongful
60
termination, compensation, harassment, and discrimination.
The use of ombudsmen in various organizations to successfully
resolve disputes in lieu of expensive and time-consuming litigation
continues to grow due to the numerous benefits the use of an
61
ombudsman provides to an organization. In light of this trend, it
follows that the law should also recognize the benefits and efficiency of
the ombudsmen in organizations and aim to facilitate the effective use
of ombudsmen by granting a privilege for communications with
ombudsmen. After all, effective use of ombudsmen does the legal
system a favor by keeping disputes from accumulating onto the already
62
congested court dockets.
III. THE KEY TO THE EFFECTIVE USE OF AN OMBUDSMAN IS A
GUARANTEE OF CONFIDENTIALITY
In light of the growing, effective use of ombudsmen to prevent and
63
resolve disputes in various types of organizations, the law needs to
strive to facilitate their effective use for the benefit of society. Like
many other dispute resolution techniques that the law has attempted to
64
facilitate the effective use of, successful use of the ombudsman process
65
depends on the presence of certain principles, or ground rules.
Multiple ombudsman associations have promulgated standards of
practice for an ombudsman to abide by which include principles that an
ombudsman must be independent, neutral, and keep communications
66
confidential. For continued growth of successful ombudsman use by

60. Lee P. Robbins & William B. Deane, The Corporate Ombuds: A New Approach to
Conflict Management, NEGOTIATION J., Apr. 1986, at 195, 201.
61. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322; Thompson, supra note 12, at 656
(discussing rise in use of ombudsmen by corporations).
62. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
63. Thompson, supra note 12, at 656 (discussing rise in use of ombudsmen by
corporations); see also supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text (discussing rise in use of
ombudsmen by the United States Government).
64. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. §§ 408, 501; Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health
Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179–80 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000)
(adopting a federal common law privilege for dispute resolution through mediation because
confidentiality of communications during mediation is key to its success); see also discussion
infra Part V (showing that creation of an ombudsman privilege would be similar to another
privilege and evidentiary exclusion currently recognized by the law).
65. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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various organizations, these standards of practice and the particular
principles that ombudsman are ethically required to abide by must be
respected by the courts if society is to continue to realize the benefits of
dispute prevention and resolution through ombudsmen.
A. The Essential Role of Confidentiality
Among the principles promulgated by ombudsman associations that
practicing ombudsmen are ethically required to abide by is
confidentiality, or protection of complainant communications with an
67
ombudsman. This protection is essential to the ombudsman dispute
68
In fact, courts have stated that “without
resolution process.
69
confidentiality, the ombuds process would not work.”
If
communications with an ombudsman in the course of attempting to
resolve a dispute were not confidential and could be disclosed and used
in subsequent litigation, the effective and timely dispute resolution
70
afforded by an ombudsman would be destroyed. Additionally, a
failure to keep communications with an ombudsman confidential would
devastate the ombudsman process beyond repair in the eyes of third
71
parties. The utmost importance of this confidentiality principle was
recognized by Congress when it enacted the Administrative Dispute
72
Resolution Act of 1990, which was intended to encourage the use of
67. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
68. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:1, at 319 (“The most important element of an ombuds
program is confidentiality of program usage.”); Marty, supra note 54, at 285 (“[T]he
effectiveness of corporate ombuds programs rests on an employee’s belief that information
divulged will remain confidential, and destroyed the employee’s confidence in that
confidentiality will destroy the corporate ombudsman program itself.”); Thompson, supra
note 12, at 654 (“[T]he ombudsman relies on the confidential nature of his office to encourage
employees to come forward . . . .”); Katherine A. Welch, Note, No Notice Is Good News:
Notice Under the New Ombuds Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds
Offices, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 193, 198 (“Key to the ombuds process is the protection afforded
to communications that are made to an ombuds by a complainant.”).
69. Welch, supra note 68, at 198–99 (discussing Garstang v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 84 (Ct. App. 1995); and Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo.
1991) (supporting the proposition that confidentiality is vital to the ombuds process)); see also
infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
70. Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 377 (“The quick and effective settlement processes
offered by the ombudsman concept would be stifled if the statements made by the
ombudsman or employee could be used in eventual legal proceedings.”).
71. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 323 (“If the necessity of confidentiality is breached,
then the program will be irreparably destroyed in the eyes of other persons.”).
72. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–84 (2006)).
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ADR in federal agencies and specifically states that communications
made to a neutral party in dispute resolution settings cannot be
73
disclosed and must remain confidential, subject to listed exceptions.
In addition to Congress recognizing the significance of
confidentiality, multiple ombudsman associations along with the
American Bar Association (ABA) have endorsed the view that when an
ombudsman has offered confidentiality to a complainant, the
74
ombudsman must maintain that confidence.
The International
Ombudsman Association’s Standards of Practice, which practicing
member ombudsmen are required to adhere by, states that ombudsmen
must maintain all communications in strict confidence, such
communications are privileged, and that any task the ombudsman
performs during the scope of his work, including data and record
75
keeping, must maintain this confidentiality as a top priority. Another
ombudsman association, the United States Ombudsman Association,
has also promulgated standards requiring confidentiality and similarly
stating that the ombudsman take strong efforts to keep all records
confidential, while adding that the ombudsman cannot be compelled to
76
testify in a formal proceeding. In addition to these ombudsman
associations, the ABA has also publicized the importance of
confidentiality in a memorandum supporting a privilege for
communications with an ombudsman and discussing the value to society
of the ombudsman as well as the indispensability of confidence to the
77
effectiveness of the process. Clearly, confidentiality of ombudsman
communications has the support of these associations.
As well as ombudsman associations, scholars, courts, and Congress
73. 5 U.S.C. § 574 (2006); Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the
U.S. Federal System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 239, 264 (2002) (“The Act prohibits
ADR neutrals and parties from voluntarily disclosing communications or from being required
to disclose communications through discovery or compulsory processes.”).
74 . See IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.1; GOVERNMENTAL
OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 2, §§ I(C), II(A)(8)(d), II(C)(1)–(2); AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS
OFFICES 5 (2004) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], available at http://www.abanet.org/leaders
hip/2004/recommendations/115.pdf (“An ombuds does not disclose and is not required to
disclose any information provided in confidence, except to address an imminent risk of
serious harm.”).
75. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.1–.8.
76. GOVERNMENTAL OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS, supra note 7, §§ I(C), II(A)(8)(d),
II(C)(1)–(3).
77. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 74; Kuta, supra note 12, at 409–10 (discussing a
memorandum produced by the ABA in support of an ombudsman privilege).
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all recognizing the importance of confidentiality, those who directly deal
with and use an ombudsman also recognize the necessity that these
78
communications be kept confidential. This belief in the significance of
confidentiality of communications is illustrated by the first question
almost all people who come to an ombudsman ask, “Is this discussion
79
off the record?” Anyone who comes to an ombudsman to voice his or
her concerns finds security and confidence in the fact that reporting an
issue to an ombudsman will be “off the record” and not later disclosed
or used adversely because these patrons know the ombudsman has a
duty under his or her standards of practice to keep the conversation
80
confidential.
The ability to have off the record, or confidential,
communications not only provides a sense of security by knowing the
conversation cannot be disclosed later or subsequently used adversely in
formal proceedings, but also provides a safe route to raise concerns
81
without the worry of retaliation in the present. This feeling of security
that a guarantee of confidentiality provides, explains why outlets for
raising issues that guarantee confidentiality receive usage rates twice
that of outlets that do not guarantee confidentiality of such
82
communications.
B. The Argument Against Confidentiality
While the focal point of this piece centers on the need for
confidentiality from the perspective of the complainant who discloses
information through the ombudsman process, recognizing a privilege for
communications with an ombudsman also necessitates that statements
made to the ombudsman by the institution or organization with whom
the complainant has an issue also remain confidential. Although the
essential role confidentiality plays from the complainant’s perspective is
83
well-documented, not everyone agrees that confidentiality is always
78. McGarry, supra note 42, at 1, 7 (recognizing the need for “strictly confidential
complaint channels” and noting that “[i]t is critical for an ombudsman office to . . . establish
procedures to ensure that confidentiality is, in fact, provided.”).
79. Id. at 7.
80. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
81. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322 (“Anonymity, confidentiality and nonretaliation provide a safe mechanism for persons to raise concerns.”).
82. McGarry, supra note 42, at 7.
83. See, e.g., Deason, supra note 73, at 243 (noting that confidentiality “is regarded as so
crucial for mediation that the importance of confidentiality itself is rarely at issue in
mediation scholarship”); see also supra Part III.A (discussing the essential role of
confidentiality in the ombudsman process).
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100% beneficial, especially when invoked to keep actions of the
84
institution or organization from the public eye.
Rather, some argue that confidentiality impedes the public’s right to
85
know. Furthermore, in contrasting the transparency of courts with the
opaqueness of ADR proceedings due to confidentiality, a court stated:
“[P]ublic access to court proceedings helps society become aware of
unfair business acts and practices, educating consumers and thereby
discouraging such activities[,]” while confidential ADR proceedings,
such as arbitration, “prevent the public from discovering such violative
86
acts and practices.” For instance, confidentiality can endanger the
public health by keeping critical information from those who need it
87
most. Additionally, as a result of keeping information out of the
public’s eye the problem of over-avoidance due to under-informed
consumers leads to shifting to inferior alternatives in both the labor and
88
goods markets. Finally, in the context of ADR, which usually involves
a third party neutral, confidentiality shields this third party neutral from
public oversight and scrutiny, and thus, there is no analog to the public
89
accountability judges have.
In the end, despite these criticisms of confidentiality, the benefits

84. Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun
Shine in On Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 466, 518–19 (2006)
(stating, among other things, that due to the secret, confidential environment ADR operates
in, a “world of mischief” can be concealed behind ADR’s closed doors).
85. Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927,
947 (2006) (“[T]he backbone of the argument against confidentiality [is] the right of the
public to know.”).
86. Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
87. See, e.g., Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 262 (Cal. 2004) (holding that
confidentiality afforded to information obtained through prior mediation prevented current
discovery of materials related to the mold-infested condition to which tenants were exposed);
Gina Kolata, Secrecy Orders in Lawsuits Prompt States’ Efforts to Restrict Their Use, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at D10 (discussing controversy regarding silicone breast implants where
data related to dangers associated with the implants had been kept in confidence from the
public for years).
88. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential
Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 907–09 (2007) (discussing the impact that news of public
settlements would have in assisting consumers and workers in distinguishing dangerous
products from good ones and dangerous jobs from safer ones); see also Kotkin, supra note 85,
at 929 (arguing that the ability to keep settlements confidential leads to invisible workplace
discrimination).
89. Doré, supra note 84, at 490 (noting that a third party neutral, such as an arbitrator,
“who already possesses largely unchecked discretion,” is free from public scrutiny due to the
confidentiality of the proceeding).
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confidentiality affords to the ombudsman process far outweigh any
perceived adverse consequences. Indeed, confidentiality is essential to
facilitate the quality of communication needed to effectively resolve
90
disputes with an organization.
IV. THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF CONFIDENTIALITY: COURTS DO NOT
ALWAYS AGREE
A. Determination of Privilege Left to the Common Law
Despite the essential role confidentiality plays in the ombudsman
process, courts over the years have taken diverging views on granting a
91
privilege for communications with an ombudsman. Federal courts
have been given the ability to determine what constitutes privileged
communications as a matter of common law by the Federal Rules of
92
Evidence.
Specifically, the federal courts are to determine what
constitutes privileged information “in the light of reason and
93
experience.” This decision in the Federal Rules of Evidence by the
Senate and the House to allow the federal courts to determine whether
a privilege exists on a case-by-case basis, rather than explicitly granting
94
an arbitrary number of privileges in specific relationships, shows the
desire of the House and Senate to encourage federal courts to continue
95
to develop privileges as necessary in specific beneficial circumstances.
90. See Deason, supra note 73, at 245–47 (discussing the benefits confidentiality affords
in mediation proceedings).
91. See, e.g., Kientzy v. McDonnell Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570, 573 (E.D. Mo. 1991)
(recognizing privilege for communications with ombudsman in that instance because of the
importance of confidentiality to the process); Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90, 90–91, 94
(S.D. Iowa 1987) (granting a privilege for ombudsman communications and stating that there
are other means for obtaining the evidence). But see Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
114 F.3d 790, 794–95 (8th Cir. 1997) (declining to recognize a privilege for communications
with an ombudsman without establishment of more facts regarding the benefit of the
ombudsman program).
92. FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the
light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege.”).
93. Id.
94. See Kuta, supra note 12, at 399–400 (noting as originally proposed by the committee
charged with writing the Federal Rules of Evidence, there was to be nine specific privileges
the federal courts were required to recognize which were as follows: lawyer-client,
psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, communications to clergymen, political vote, trade
secrets, secrets of state and other official information, and the identity of informers).
95. Id.; Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1996) (“[Federal Rule of Evidence 501] did
not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in
our history, but rather directed federal courts to ‘continue the evolutionary development of

13 SPANIMAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/6/2013 9:31 PM

OMBUDSMAN PRIVILEGE

675

Putting this authority into practice, federal courts have recognized
communications as privileged when the interests the privilege promotes
sufficiently outweigh the normally predominate principle of using all
96
available means of obtaining evidence to determine the truth.
The debate as to whether a privilege should apply generally contains
the same arguments on both sides notwithstanding the particular subject
matter sought to be protected through a privilege. Those against
granting a privilege in a specific circumstance cite the old adage that
97
“the public has a claim to every man’s evidence.” Furthermore, those
opposing the creation of a wholly new privilege argue that it is a big step
and creating such a barrier to obtaining relevant evidence in the truth
98
seeking process must not be undertaken lightly. On the other hand,
those proponents of a privilege contend that without the privilege most
of the desirable evidence that a party seeks, such as admissions against
interest, exists because of the privilege and is not likely to have come
99
into being in the first place if there were no such privilege.
Additionally, these proponents point out that when a privilege is
granted it is limited in the sense that it only bars disclosure of the
communication itself, and it does not prevent a party seeking certain
evidence from obtaining and using the underlying facts of that
100
communication through other means. Such arguments are taken into
account by a court when determining whether a privilege will apply in

testimonial privileges.’” (citation omitted)).
96. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9; Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (defining
adverse spousal testimony privilege to apply only to the witness-spouse, and finding that such
a privilege furthered the important public interest in marital communications without overly
burdening evidentiary needs); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (“every . . .
exemption is grounded in a substantial individual interest which has been found, through
centuries of experience, to outweigh the public interest in the search for truth.”).
97. 12 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 25 (London, T.C. Hansard
1812) [hereinafter COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY].
98. Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1997) (“To justify
the creation of a privilege, [the defendant] must first establish that society benefits in some
significant way from the particular brand of confidentiality that the privilege affords.”).
99. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12 (“Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which
litigants such as petitioner seek access—for example, admissions against interest by a party—
is unlikely to come into being [and] [t]his unspoken ‘evidence’ will therefore serve no greater
truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged.”).
100. Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90, 93 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (“The privileged nature of
communications [the ombudsman] received as the ombudsman does not prevent the plaintiffs
from using other means to prove the existence of facts communicated to him.”).
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101

the particular case.
The federal courts’ process for determining whether a privilege
102
exists on a case-by-case basis “in the light of reason and experience” is
substantially the same as the state courts’ process where determinations
103
of privileges are also left to the common law. The only difference,
however, is that many states have explicitly adopted statutory provisions
104
addressing privileges in certain specific circumstances.
Therefore,
when such specific circumstances are at issue and the statutory provision
is called into operation, there is no need to leave the determination of a
privilege up to the court; the issue has already been determined as a
matter of policy by the state’s legislature.

101. See id. at 92–93.
102. FED. R. EVID. 501; see, e.g., Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8–9; United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d
1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing some of the factors taken into consideration when the court
determined the applicability of the spousal privilege: that the husband intended his
conversations with this wife to be confidential; that there is no exception to spousal privilege
in communications related to financial matters; that it did not matter whether the husband
relayed to his wife the events already occurred in these conversations; and that it did not
matter that the spousal communications took place at the same time as criminal act conduct
with which the husband was charged in the present case).
103. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 130 (“Rule 501 allows federal courts to recognize new
privileges based on common law principles, applying the court’s ‘reason and experience,’ on a
case-by-case basis.”)
104. See Deason, supra note 73, at 259 (“Many of the states with general mediation
statutes or evidentiary rules chose privilege as the most effective framework for protecting
confidentiality in legal proceedings . . . .”); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.55.160(b) (2010)
(“The ombudsman shall maintain confidentiality with respect to all matters and the identities
of the complainants or witnesses coming before the ombudsman except insofar as disclosures
may be necessary to enable the ombudsman to carry out duties and to support
recommendations.”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 96-9(b) (LexisNexis 2012) (“The ombudsman
is required to maintain secrecy in respect to all matters and the identities of the complainants
or witnesses coming before the ombudsman except so far as disclosures may be necessary to
enable the ombudsman to carry out the ombudsman’s duties and to support the ombudsman’s
recommendations.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 2C.20 (West 2008) (“[N]or shall the citizens’ aide
or any member of the staff be compelled to testify in any court with respect to any matter
involving the exercise of the citizens’ aide’s official duties . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,253
(2008) (“Neither the Public Counsel nor any member of his staff shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding concerning matters within his
official cognizance . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.06A.060 (West 2009) (“Neither the
ombudsman nor the ombudsman’s staff may be compelled, in any judicial or administrative
proceeding, to testify or to produce evidence regarding the exercise of the official duties of
the ombudsman or of the ombudsman’s staff.”).
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B. Early Common Law on Privilege for Communications with an
Ombudsman
As a result of leaving the determination of whether privileges should
exist up to the common law, much inconsistency regarding the
recognition of a privilege for communications with an ombudsman has
105
resulted among courts over time. Early on, courts began to recognize
a privilege for communications with an ombudsman in specific contexts
106
on a case-by-case basis.
The first case to apply Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in the context
107
of communications with an ombudsman, Shabazz v. Scurr, ruled that
108
Shabazz held that
such communications were privileged.
communications made specifically to a prison ombudsman were
privileged, reasoning that this confidentiality encouraged such
109
complaints to be brought freely.
The next case brought to court
concerning the recognition of a privilege for communications with an
ombudsman occurred in Monoranjan Roy v. United Technologies
110
Corp. In fact, Roy was the first court to recognize a privilege for
communications with an ombudsman in a corporate setting by holding
that in this specific case there was a privilege from discovery for the
defendant company’s ombudsman because the communications in the
context presented there, between the corporate ombudsman and an
111
employee of the corporation, were privileged.
Shortly after Roy, the court in Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas
112
Corp. continued the trend of recognizing an ombudsman privilege
113
In Kientzy, the plaintiff, a
under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
former employee of the defendant corporation, brought suit claiming
wrongful termination and as part of discovery sought to take a

105. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
106. See Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 373.
107. Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Iowa 1987).
108. Id. at 90–91.
109. Id. at 92 (“[A]nything which chills a citizen’s willingness to come forward limits the
[ombudsman] office’s effectiveness in the long run . . . .”).
110. Roy v. United Techs. Corp., No. H–89–680, at 23–24 (D. Conn. May 29, 1990).
111. Id.; Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 373.
112. Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
113. Id. at 571; see also Van Soye, supra note 12, at 130 (discussing Kientzy);
Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 373 (noting that Monoranjan Roy expanded the Kientzy
decision and found a privilege applicable to the communications of a corporate ombudsman
and an employee).
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deposition of the defendant’s ombudsman concerning communications
made to the ombudsman by defendant’s management involved in the
114
decision to terminate the plaintiff. However, the court held that such
communications made to the ombudsman in the circumstances
presented to the court, were privileged, and, therefore, the plaintiff
could not compel the ombudsman nor the management to disclose the
statements made between each other regarding the plaintiff’s
115
termination.
The court found the communications with the
ombudsman to be confidential because the following four facts were
present in this case: 1) the statements were made with the belief that
they would be kept confidential; 2) the need for confidential
communication is essential to the effective functioning of the
ombudsman; 3) the relationship between the ombudsman and the
defendant’s employees and management is worthy of societal
protection; and 4) the benefit to plaintiff gained by disclosure is
outweighed by the harm that would be caused by an interference in the
116
confidential relationship between the ombudsman and others.
C. Reversal of the Early Common Law on Privilege for Communications
with an Ombudsman
Despite the early trend of courts to recognize a privilege for
communications with an ombudsman under Federal Rule of Evidence
501, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later rendered a
decision that marked a polar shift in the court’s view of an ombudsman
117
privilege.
118
The Eighth Circuit held in Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
that an employee’s confidential communications made to the
119
corporation’s ombudsman were not privileged. This holding was a
120
121
complete departure from the previous decisions of Shabazz, Roy,
114. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 571.
115. Id. at 573 (noting, as with all privileges, that plaintiffs cannot compel anyone to
disclose their specific statements to the corporation’s ombudsman but could compel
disclosure of any facts known to them, even though these facts may have been contained in
statements to the ombudsman).
116. Id. at 571–72.
117. Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794–95 (8th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting Kientzy holding and denying a privilege for communications with an ombudsman in
the same program at issue in Kientzy).
118. Id. at 790.
119. Id. at 794–95.
120. See Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90, 90–91 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (recognizing a
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122

and Kientzy.
The Carman court reasoned that in the specific
circumstances McDonnell Douglas had not provided any evidence that
its ombudsman process was successful at resolving disputes involving the
corporation prior to litigation. The court also noted that McDonnell
Douglas failed to show that the advantages of the ombudsman program
would be lost without a privilege because the ombudsman could still
promise to keep the employee’s communications confidential from
123
corporate management.
Furthermore, the court stated that for
McDonnell Douglas to justify the creation of an ombudsman privilege,
it needed to first demonstrate that “society benefits in some significant
way from the particular brand of confidentiality that the privilege
124
affords.”
Not only did the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Carman mark a change
125
in the court’s view towards an ombudsman privilege, it presents a
126
troubling dilemma for all practicing ombudsmen. As discussed earlier,
ombudsmen are required to adhere to standards of practice
promulgated by the ombudsman association to which they are
127
members.
These standards of practice include the duty that all
communications made to the ombudsman are privileged and must be
128
maintained in confidence by the ombudsman as a top priority. These
mandates of the standards of practice for ombudsmen stand in direct
conflict with the Carman court’s holding that the communications made
to the ombudsman in that case were not privileged and the ombudsman
129
could be compelled to disclose the communications in litigation. This
now leaves practicing ombudsmen to choose between violating the

privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for communications with a prison ombudsman
because it encourages complainants to come forward).
121. See Roy v. United Techs. Corp., No. H–89–680 23–24 (D.Conn. May 29, 1990)
(recognizing a privilege for communications with a corporate ombudsman under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501).
122. See Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570, 573 (E.D. Mo. 1991)
(holding that corporation’s ombudsman could not be compelled to disclose communications
made to her by corporation’s management regarding the termination of the plaintiff).
123. Carman, 114 F.3d at 793–94.
124. Id. at 794.
125. Id. at 794–95.
126. See supra Part III.
127. See generally IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7; GOVERNMENTAL
OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS, supra note 7.
128. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
129. Carman, 114 F.3d at 794–95.
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ombudsman standards of practice they have vowed to abide by or
disregarding a court order to disclose communications that were thought
130
to be made in confidence.
D. Persuading a Court to Grant an Ombudsman Privilege Today
The few subsequent cases since Carman dealing with the issue of an
ombudsman privilege have done little to help clear up the troubling
131
conflict ombudsmen are now confronted with between their standards
of practice and courts denying a privilege for communications with an
132
133
ombudsman.
However, despite the decision in Carman, because
134
privileges are granted on a case-by-case basis it is still entirely possible
that a court would grant an ombudsman privilege when a strong enough
factual showing has been made as to the importance and effectiveness of
135
the ombudsman in the specific case. Such a showing was not made in
136
Carman. In fact, by the time the suit was brought, the ombudsman
office at issue had been abolished and no facts whatsoever were
provided to the court regarding the ombudsman office in general, much
137
less how the office operated or why the privilege was important. As a
result, because no facts were presented to the court to justify
entitlement to an ombudsman privilege, the court had no choice but to
138
deny such a privilege in the specific case.
Therefore, as the law
concerning an ombudsman privilege currently stands, the best way for a
practicing ombudsman to avoid conflict between his or her standards of
130. Compare IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.1 (“The Ombudsman
holds all communications with those seeking assistance in strict confidence . . . .”), and
GOVERNMENTAL OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS, supra note 7, § II(C)(1) (“The Ombudsman
should not reveal information when confidentiality has been promised.”), with Carman, 114
F.3d at 794–95 (ordering an ombudsman to produce evidence of employee communications
thought to have been made in confidence).
131. See, e.g., Miller v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., No. 98-1012, 1999 WL 506520, at
*15 (10th Cir. July 19, 1999) (denying privilege for communications with an ombudsman).
132. See supra Part IV.C.
133. Carman, 114 F.3d at 794.
134. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
135. See Carman, 114 F.3d at 793–94; Van Soye, supra note 12, at 132; Charles L.
Howard & George R. Wratney, In Aftermath of the Carman Decision, Ombuds “Privilege”
Still Has Validity, ETHIKOS, May/June 1999, at 9–10.
136. Carman, 114 F.3d at 793 (stating that no evidence was presented, and was not even
argued, showing the success of the ombudsman office or advantages provided by having the
office).
137. Id.; Marty, supra note 54, at 281; Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 9–10.
138. See Carman, 114 F.3d at 793; Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 10.
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practice mandating communications be kept confidential and a court
potentially denying a privilege and compelling disclosure of the
140
confidential communications is to prove entitlement to an ombudsman
141
privilege in every case brought before a court.
Proving entitlement to an ombudsman privilege can be done by
demonstrating to the court why confidentiality is vital to the effective
142
use of the ombudsman process and that the relationship between an
143
Additionally,
ombudsman and a complainant benefits society.
showing how the process works within the organization, presenting the
ombudsman standards of practice promulgated by various respected
organizations and followed by ombudsmen, and producing detailed
statistics regarding the use of the ombudsman’s office within the
organization can all successfully persuade a court to understand why an
ombudsman privilege is necessary and must be granted in the particular
144
case before it.
E. Other Ways to Attempt to Keep Communications with an
Ombudsman Confidential Without Having to Persuade a Court to Grant
a Privilege
Persuading a court to grant a privilege for communications with an
145
ombudsman each time the issue is brought before the court can be
146
unpredictable and require significant resources. Therefore, alternate
ways of keeping communications with an ombudsman confidential
without the need for a court’s agreement that such communications
should be protected are desirable.
Perhaps the easiest way for an ombudsman to attempt to keep
communications confidential, and thus remain in compliance with the
147
ombudsman’s standards of practice, without the need to persuade a
139. See IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.1.
140. See, e.g., Carman, 114 F.3d at 794–95.
141. Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 10.
142. Marty, supra note 54, at 286; Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 10, 13; see
supra Part III.
143. Marty, supra note 54, at 286 (explaining that “[a]ny corporation that hopes to
invoke the ombudsman privilege will have to convince the court . . . that this relationship is
one that benefits society as a whole”).
144. Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 10, 13, 16.
145. See supra Part IV.D (detailing how to persuade a court in a particular case why a
privilege for communications with an ombudsman should be granted).
146. See Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 10, 13, 16.
147. See supra Part III (noting that ombudsmen standards of practice require an
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court to grant a privilege is to have each complainant who comes to the
148
ombudsman sign a confidentiality agreement.
The use of
confidentiality agreements not only reinforces to complainants that their
communications will not be disclosed, but it also serves as evidence that
complainants had a belief that their communications with an
149
ombudsman would be kept confidential.
Such evidence of an
individual’s belief about the ombudsman program is important because
the further it can be demonstrated that potential complainants were
promised confidentiality in their communications with an ombudsman,
the greater the likelihood a court will refuse to allow these
150
communications to be disclosed at trial.
Therefore, a practicing
ombudsman should routinely have all complainants sign confidentiality
agreements in order to decrease the likelihood a court would require the
151
communications be disclosed in future litigation.
Another technique, which is similar to executing confidentiality
agreements, used by organizations to attempt to protect
communications with an ombudsman from compulsory disclosure in
litigation is to include in the bylaws of the specific organization that all
152
communications with the organization’s ombudsman are confidential.
For example, the United Nations Office of the Ombudsman has
included in its bylaws that all communications with the Office of the
Ombudsman are to be confidential and remain so unless one of three
conditions is met: waiver by the complainant; explicit permission by a
U.N. staff member; or imminent risk of serious harm without a
153
reasonable alternative. It stands to reason that if a court is willing to
keep communications confidential because potential complainants were
ombudsman to keep all communications confidential).
148. See Van Soye, supra note 12, at 141–42; Deason, supra note 73, at 251.
149. See Garstang v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84, 88–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
Evidence that complainants were led to believe their communications with an ombudsman
would be kept in confidence has been used to keep communications with an ombudsman
from being used as evidence at trial. See id. (emphasizing the complainants’ belief that their
communications would be kept confidential in refusing to allow the communications to the
ombudsman to be disclosed for evidentiary use at trial).
150. Id. (holding that the privacy of the parties due to the private nature of the
communications and the existence of a pledge of confidentiality required that the discovery of
such communications with the corporate ombudsman be denied).
151. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 145–46.
152. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 56, at 3 (noting that the United
Nation’s bylaws state that communications by the Office of United Nations Ombudsman and
Mediation Services are required to be kept confidential).
153. Id.
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led to believe their communications would be kept in confidence, a
court should keep communications with an ombudsman confidential
where the ombudsman is part of an organization whose bylaws require
and make it known that the communications are to be confidential—
essentially an implicit confidentiality agreement.
Finally, depending on the jurisdiction, there may be no need to
persuade a court that communications with an ombudsman should be
privileged in the specific case because of the particular jurisdiction’s
155
statutes.
Some states have recognized the important role
confidentiality plays in the ombudsman process and have created
statutes providing that communications with an ombudsman are to be
156
privileged.
However, only a small minority of jurisdictions have
statutes addressing whether communications with an ombudsman are
157
privileged, and of those that do the statutes vary extensively.
Consequently, the best practice for an ombudsman is still to have all
158
complainants sign confidentiality agreements
regardless of the
jurisdiction because even where a state statute declares communications
with an ombudsman to be privileged, the issue of the confidentiality of
the communications could still later be addressed in another case under
a different jurisdiction’s law.
V. CREATION OF AN OMBUDSMAN PRIVILEGE WOULD BE SIMILAR TO
ANOTHER PRIVILEGE AND EVIDENTIARY EXCLUSION CURRENTLY
RECOGNIZED BY THE LAW
Despite the old saying that “the public has a claim to every man’s
159
evidence” and the common understanding that the creation of a
wholly new privilege is a big step that should not be undertaken
160
lightly,
recognizing a privilege for communications with an
ombudsman would be very analogous to another privilege as well as to
161
an evidentiary exclusion acknowledged under the law today. Indeed,
154. See Garstang, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
155. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
157. See Kuta, supra note 12, at 395–97 (discussing the varying state statutes in the area
of ombudsman communications).
158. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 141–42 (noting that confidentiality agreements are
arguably “the key to maintaining the secrecy of proceedings”).
159. See COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 97.
160. See, e.g., Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1997).
161. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4) (2006). These procedures
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the particular privilege and the evidentiary exclusion recognized today
are strikingly similar in their principles (in the case of the current
privilege, it even encompasses a major function an ombudsman
162
performs ) to those a privilege for communications with an
163
ombudsman would serve.
Therefore, because an ombudsman
privilege would be exceptionally similar to another currently recognized
privilege and evidentiary exclusion, creating an ombudsman privilege is
164
not “a wholly new . . . privilege” or even a “big step.”
A. Similarity to the Mediation Privilege
The ombudsman process is exceedingly similar to, and rather
165
frequently includes, mediation. Mediation is a process whereby a
166
neutral assists the parties to a dispute in reaching a settlement.
167
Mediation does not need to be formally labeled as such, and in fact
there are no special requirements (except that usually the parties desire
someone who is neutral to the dispute) that need to be met for one to
168
qualify as a mediator. Communications made during mediation are
169
protected as privileged under federal law and a majority of states’
170
laws, although the extent and scope of the protection varies.
In performing his or her role, the ombudsman seeks to settle
complaints brought concerning the organization the ombudsman is a
provide confidentiality for employees’ submissions concerning “questionable accounting”
practices within their company. Id. In fact, many companies have elected to create an
ombudsman office to receive these confidential complaints. Welch, supra note 68, at 206–07.
162. See infra Part V.A.
163. See infra Part V.A–B.
164. Carman, 114 F.3d at 794.
165. GOVERNMENTAL OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS, supra note 7, § II(D)(2)(b) (noting
that mediation of disputes is part of an ombudsman’s role).
166. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115(a) (West 2009) (defining mediation as “a process
in which a neutral person . . . facilitate[s] communication between the disputants to assist
them in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement”); GRENIG, supra note 22, § 4:3, at 63
(noting that a neutral assists parties in settling disputes).
167. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 142.
168. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 4:40–:41, at 80–82 (discussing both the characteristics
as well as roles and functions of a competent and effective mediator).
169. E.g., In re RDM Sports Grp, Inc., 277 B.R. 415, 438 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002); Folb v.
Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 1998),
aff'd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
170. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12–2238 (2011); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West
2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–22–307 (West 2011); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/6 (West
2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679.12 (West 1998); WIS. STAT. § 904.085 (2009–2010); see also
Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1178–80 (discussing mediation privilege status in some of the states).
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part of through direct resolution, investigation, advocacy, or
171
mediation. As a result of mediation being broadly defined as a neutral
assisting two parties in resolving their dispute and there being no
requirement that a formal title be given to the interactions, a significant
portion of what an ombudsman does on a daily basis when handling
172
complaints is mediation.
When an employee of the organization
brings a complaint to the ombudsman, the ombudsman acts as the
mediator between the complainant employee and the organization to
173
assist these two parties in resolving the dispute. Therefore, it stands to
reason that those communications made to the ombudsman in the
context of settling a dispute should almost certainly meet the definition
174
of mediation and be protected under the mediation privilege.
There are two major differences between a traditional mediator and
an ombudsman mediating a dispute between his or her organization and
a complainant that can make mediation through an ombudsman more
effective. One main difference between a traditional mediator and an
ombudsman is that when an ombudsman is doing the mediating the
ombudsman has additional capabilities, which a traditional mediator
would not have, to generate detailed information and investigate aspects
175
of the dispute from within the organization.
This ability of an
ombudsman can lead to a resolution of the dispute that is more
specifically fitted to, and therefore more satisfactory to, the parties at
176
hand. The other main difference between a traditional mediator and
an ombudsman again results from the ombudsman’s position within the
organization and the power given to many ombudsmen to help initiate
177
changes within the organization. Whereas a traditional mediator only
171. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:26, at 334 (“The common duties of ombuds include:
listening to and taking in contacts from targeted stakeholders, investigating the concerns or
questions, making recommendations to the organization, and reporting on ombuds’
activities.”); YARN & JONES, supra note 56, § 11:31, at 372–73; Thompson, supra note 12, at
672.
172. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 142 (stating that because “[m]ediation need not be
formally designated as such,” the ombudsman can be considered a mediator).
173. See Kuta, supra note 12, at 391.
174. See Van Soye, supra note 12, at 142–43 (stating that because “[m]ediation need not
be formally designated as such,” the ombudsman can be considered a mediator and “[t]he
mediation privilege [can] belong[] to the neutral ombudsman”).
175. See Kuta, supra note 12, at 390–92 (discussing an ombudsman’s extensive
investigation powers).
176. See id. at 390–91.
177. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:1, at 318 (mentioning ombudsmen have superior
access to upper management).
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has the power to recommend rather general settlements to the dispute,
an ombudsman in many organizations has the power to not only
recommend a wider range of remedies for settlement, such as internal
procedural changes in the organization, but also to try and ensure that
179
the final resolution to the dispute is followed through.
Consequently, because the mediation privilege that is recognized
today encompasses a chief portion of what an ombudsman does on a
180
daily basis,
creating a privilege for communications with an
ombudsman is the logical next step. After all, in many ways an
ombudsman can resolve disputes through mediation more effectively
than even the most well-respected mediators could in the circumstances
because the ombudsman has the ability to use his or her position inside
the organization to ensure a more tailored and pleasing resolution for
181
the disputing parties.
B. Similarity to Exclusion of Settlement Negotiations
The creation of a privilege for communications with an ombudsman
would not constitute a big step because the privilege would be based
on—and further—the same policy that is currently embodied by an
evidence rule excluding conduct or statements made in compromise
182
negotiations. Specifically, Federal Rule of Evidence 408 states that
any evidence of “conduct or statement[s] made in compromise
183
negotiations regarding the claim” is not admissible at trial.
The
purpose and policy furthered by this rule is society’s interest in
184
encouraging settlement of disputes outside of court. In fact, this policy

178. See id. § 4:2, at 62 (noting disadvantage of traditional mediation is that “[t]he results
are not binding on the parties”).
179. See id. § 13:2–:3, :25, at 321–22, 334 (noting respectively that one result of an
ombudsman program is to “correct patterns of undesirable practices and procedures,” that
ombudsman can connect a complainant to a “decision-maker in the company that will be [sic]
to settle the dispute,” and that “[o]ften organizations insist that the ombuds[man] report to
the highest level of management in the organization”).
180. See Kuta, supra note 12, at 391 (“[A]n [o]mbudsman provides assistance to
individuals with problems or concerns in a neutral, non-biased manner.”).
181. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 4:41, at 82 (“An effective mediator suggests creative
ways to resolve the dispute”); id. 13:1, at 318–19 (stating that an ombudsman “serves as a
contact person for all conflicts in the organization”).
182. FED. R. EVID. 408.
183. Id. at 408(a)(2).
184. Id. at 408 (advisory committee’s note declaring that the rule is intended for the
“promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes”).
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of encouraging the settlement of disputes outside of court has become
185
increasingly prevalent in legislation more recently due in large part to
186
today’s crowded court dockets.
In light of Rule 408 keeping any “conduct or statement[s] made in
187
compromise negotiations” from being disclosed at trial, it stands to
reason that much of what an ombudsman does on a daily basis could fit
188
under this exclusion.
Regularly, an ombudsman deals with claims
centering on discrimination, retaliation, safety, and other employment
related disputes that the ombudsman may attempt to conduct
compromise negotiations between the complainant and the
189
organization.
Not only does an ombudsman’s routine function of
conducting compromise negotiations in regard to what could otherwise
be numerous lawsuits sensibly fit within the exclusion of Rule 408, in so
performing his or her role an ombudsman is directly furthering the
policy behind Rule 408 of encouraging settlement of disputes outside of
190
court. Therefore, because the ombudsman is regularly advancing the
policy that justifies the exclusion of conduct or statements from trial
under Rule 408, it seems logical to exclude the conduct or statements of
an ombudsman from trial by granting an ombudsman privilege.
Opponents to granting an ombudsman privilege, or in fact any
privilege, justify their argument on the old principle that “the public has
191
a right to every man’s evidence.” While it is true that in the past in
many cases it may have been more vital to ascertain the truth of what
happened than further a policy or protect a confidentiality interest,
today’s times are different. As a result of today’s increasing court
192
congestion, Rule 408 as well as other relatively recent pieces of

185. See, e.g., Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–84 (2006)
(requiring federal agencies, under section 571, to adopt policies addressing the use of
alternative dispute resolution to settle disputes as an alternative to court).
186. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
187. FED. R. EVID. 408.
188. See id. at 408(a). This is true if, as Rule 408 requires, there is “a disputed claim.”
Id. This means that an ombudsman’s statements or conduct when assisting in compromise
negotiations will be excluded (Rule 408 excludes statements from anyone in compromise
negotiations, not just the parties to the dispute) from trial as long as one of the parties has a
“claim,” and that claim is “disputed.” Id.
189. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:2, at 320.
190. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
191. See COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 97.
192. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
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legislation, such as the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, display
society’s view that encouraging the settlement of disputes outside of the
courtroom in many instances is more important than making every piece
194
of evidence accessible when attempting to ascertain the truth. Thus,
because the role of an ombudsman serves this policy of resolving
disputes outside of court a privilege should be granted for
communications with an ombudsman in order to permit ombudsmen to
195
effectively resolve disputes in lieu of court.
VI. CONCLUSION
In today’s society new ways to resolve disputes in lieu of litigation
are becoming increasingly important. One effective way to resolve
disagreements outside court is the implementation of an ombudsman in
various organizations. However, for an ombudsman to effectively
resolve disputes the complainants need to be guaranteed that their
communications with the ombudsman will remain confidential.
Although courts have recently denied a privilege for communications
with an ombudsman, the creation of such a privilege is merely the next
logical step in furthering society’s current policy of encouraging
settlement of conflicts outside of court. Statistics show that an
ombudsman can effectively resolve disputes quickly and provide
creative settlements that would not otherwise be possible through
litigation, but before these benefits can be fully realized, a privilege for
communications with an ombudsman must be granted to facilitate the
effectiveness of the ombudsman process.
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195. See supra Part III (discussing the essential role confidentiality—which results from
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